



Kim Lane Scheppele† 
Buried within the general phenomenon of democratic decline is a set of cases 
in which charismatic new leaders are elected by democratic publics and then use 
their electoral mandates to dismantle by law the constitutional systems they inher-
ited. These leaders aim to consolidate power and to remain in office indefinitely, 
eventually eliminating the ability of democratic publics to exercise their basic dem-
ocratic rights, to hold leaders accountable, and to change their leaders peacefully. 
Because these “legalistic autocrats” deploy the law to achieve their aims, impending 
autocracy may not be evident at the start. But we can learn to spot the legalistic 
autocrats before autocratic constitutionalism becomes fatal because they are often 
following a script using tactics that they borrow from each other. This Essay ex-
plains the paths that these autocratic legalists take, the danger signals that accom-
pany their legal reforms, and the methods they use to dismantle liberal constitutions. 
The Essay also suggests how the legalistic autocrats may be stopped. 
INTRODUCTION 
By now, we know the pattern: A constitutional democracy, 
flawed but in reasonably good standing, is hit by a transformative 
election. A charismatic new leader comes to power, propelled by 
the growing impatience that the electorate feels with things as 
they are. The leader promises to sweep away the dysfunctions of 
partisanship, gridlock, bureaucracy. He claims to call things by 
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their right names and to speak the unspeakable. He rails against 
entrenched power, entrenched people, entrenched structure. He 
rallies the people by assuring them that the state belongs to them, 
only them. He wins an upset victory over the establishment forces 
and starts a constitutional revolution. 
Around the world, liberal constitutionalism is taking a hit 
from charismatic leaders like these whose signature promise is to 
not play by the old rules. But such hits have been long foretold. 
In one constitutional democracy after another, publics have 
grown increasingly discontent with their political institutions.1 
This decline in public trust is particularly pronounced in coun-
tries that were hit hard by the global financial crisis of 2008 and 
after.2 But while the Great Recession made matters worse, dem-
ocratic decline was already underway because the number of 
countries that could call themselves democracies in good stand-
ing began to drop before the economic crisis hit.3 Democratic ma-
laise has economic correlates, but the causes go beyond econom-
ics.4 Something even bigger must be going wrong with democracy 
across many countries at once. 
The reasons for, and even the existence of, democratic decline 
are contested. Some claim that scholars overcounted democracies 
in the first place, so the drop in the number of democracies we are 
observing worldwide is just the reversion to type of countries that 
 
 1 Taking the average of OECD countries, trust in public institutions declined from 
approximately 44 percent in 2009 to approximately 36 percent in 2013. See Esteban Ortiz-
Ospina and Max Roser, Trust (Our World in Data, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/W5ET 
-R536. But that is an average; particular countries record even more devastating declines. 
For example, in recent years, only about 10 percent of Americans have a “great deal/quite a 
lot” of trust in Congress, down from around 40 percent in the 1970s. Confidence in Institu-
tions (Gallup, 2017), online at http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx 
(visited Oct 29, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 2 Recent data from within the European Union shows a precipitous decline in trust 
in both EU institutions and national institutions since the global financial crisis and the 
Eurozone debt crisis. Trust in government in EU debtor countries declined from between 40 
to 50 percent before the crisis to less than 20 percent in 2015. See Chase Foster and Jeffry 
Frieden, Crisis of Trust: Socio-economic Determinants of Europeans’ Confidence in Govern-
ment *12 (Harvard Working Paper, Feb 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/43CK-BKJD. 
 3 Every Freedom House democracy indicator has declined since 2006, and 105 coun-
tries suffered net declines in democracy indicators during the decade from 2006 to 2016. See 
Arch Puddington, Breaking Down Democracy: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Au-
thoritarians *3–5 (Freedom House, June 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/DCK4-VVLL. 
 4 See Marc F. Plattner, Is Democracy in Decline?, 13 Democracy & Society 1, 4 (Fall–
Winter 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/X29H-2NNR (pointing to the causal role of “bad 
governance,” which “refers in the first instance to the failure of many new democracies to 
build well-functioning and effective states, which often leads to lagging economic growth, 
poor public services, lack of personal security, and pervasive corruption”). 
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were never really democratic in the first place.5 Others claim that 
even long-standing democracies have been falling apart in the 
last decade or so at a higher rate than ever before and that we are 
therefore witnessing a major democratic recession, in which even 
the democracies that have not failed are getting worse.6 On bal-
ance, I think that the “democratic decline” camp has the better 
case. What is particularly disturbing about this phenomenon, 
however, is not the sheer number of democracies that have proven 
vulnerable, but instead the way that a number of these failing 
democracies have retreated from their earlier standards. As I ar-
gue in this Essay, democracies are not just failing for cultural or 
economic or political reasons. Some constitutional democracies 
are being deliberately hijacked by a set of legally clever autocrats, 
who use constitutionalism and democracy to destroy both. 
Buried in the story of decline, then, is a story of constitutional 
malice. New autocrats are not just benefiting from the crisis of 
confidence in public institutions; they are attacking the basic 
principles of liberal and democratic constitutionalism because 
they want to consolidate power and entrench themselves in office 
for the long haul. To outside observers who simply note that elec-
tions continue to occur and nothing illegal is going on in these 
places, it may seem that these democracies are in good (or good 
enough) health. But the autocrats who hijack constitutions seek 
to benefit from the superficial appearance of both democracy and 
legality within their states. They use their democratic mandates 
to launch legal reforms that remove the checks on executive 
power, limit the challenges to their rule, and undermine the cru-
cial accountability institutions of a democratic state. Because 
these autocrats push their illiberal measures with electoral back-
ing and use constitutional or legal methods to accomplish their 
 
 5 See, for example, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, The Myth of Democratic Reces-
sion, in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds, Democracy in Decline? 58, 59 (Johns 
Hopkins 2015). 
 6 Professor Larry Diamond counts twenty-five specific cases of democratic break-
down in which he believes that misclassification is not the story. See Larry Diamond, Fac-
ing Up to the Democratic Recession, in Diamond and Plattner, eds, Democracy in Decline? 
98, 102–04 (cited in note 5). See also Puddington, Breaking Down Democracy at 3, 5 (cited 
in note 3) (showing that there has been an across-the-board decline in the indicators that 
Freedom House uses to measure democratic health of nations and calling the period from 
2006 to 2016 the “decade of decline”). Professors Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq distinguish 
sudden collapses of democratic governments, which they call reversions, from gradual ero-
sion of constitutionalism, which they call retrogressions, and they document a growing 
number of the second in recent years. See Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a 
Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L Rev *13–16 (forthcoming 2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/G48G-6ZDB. 
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aims, they can hide their autocratic designs in the pluralism of 
legitimate legal forms. 
Constitutional democracy is indeed a pluralistic category. 
There is a wide but normatively justifiable variation in the in-
stitutional forms and substantive rules that one can find among 
constitutional-democratic states. Within those legitimate varia-
tions, some combinations of these forms and rules prove toxic to 
the continued maintenance of the liberal forms of constitutional 
democracy. And the new autocrats are finding those combina-
tions. While democracy, constitutionalism, and liberalism once 
marched arm in arm through history, we now see liberalism being 
pushed out of the parade by a new generation of autocrats who 
know how to game the system. Intolerant majoritarianism and 
plebiscitary acclimation of charismatic leaders are now masquer-
ading as democracy, led by new autocrats who first came to power 
through elections and then translated their victories into illiberal 
constitutionalism. When electoral mandates plus constitutional 
and legal change are used in the service of an illiberal agenda, I 
call this phenomenon autocratic legalism.7 
This Essay focuses on the particular cases of autocratic legal-
ism within the general phenomenon of democratic decline. By at-
tacking the very basis of a constitutional order while using the 
methods made possible by that constitutional order, the new illib-
erals may be cheered on at first by the adulating crowds who 
sought change, but those same crowds will find these illiberals 
impossible to remove once they have destroyed the constitutional 
system that could have maintained their democratic accountabil-
ity over the long run. 
To get a better sense for how the legalistic autocrats function, 
Part I turns to the question of how one can recognize them early 
on. Next, Part II shows how the weaknesses and complexities in 
the theory of liberal democratic constitutionalism itself can be 
used to undermine liberalism. Then, Part III traces the typical 
 
 7 Professor Javier Corrales first used this phrase to describe Hugo Chávez’s rule in 
Venezuela. Corrales identified autocratic legalism with the “use, abuse and non-use . . . of 
law” to describe what Chávez did to consolidate political power and sideline competitors. 
Chávez used the law by pushing the parliament to pass new laws giving him new powers, 
abused the law by deliberately changing the interpretation of law on the books to suit his 
goals, and non-used the law by failing to enforce law that stood in his way. See Javier 
Corrales, Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela, 26 J Democracy 37, 38–45 (Apr 2015). My use 
of the phrase “autocratic legalism” is compatible with Corrales’s formulation, because it 
also highlights the extraordinary attention that the new autocrats pay to law as a tool of 
power consolidation, but I differ from him in emphasizing the deliberate creation of new 
law as a way of consolidating political power. 
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script of the autocratic legalists to show precisely how they con-
solidate power under cover of law. The Essay concludes by asking 
what it would take to stop legalistic autocracy before it does ir-
reparable harm to a liberal and constitutional democracy. 
I.  METHODS AND MADNESS 
How does one recognize an autocratic legalist in action? One 
should first suspect a democratically elected leader of autocratic 
legalism when he8 launches a concerted and sustained attack on 
institutions whose job it is to check his actions or on rules that 
hold him to account, even when he does so in the name of his dem-
ocratic mandate. Loosening the bonds of constitutional constraint 
on executive power through legal reform is the first sign of the 
autocratic legalist. 
Hungary since 2010 has been my archetypal case. That year, 
the popularly elected government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
won 68 percent of the seats in Parliament with 53 percent of the 
popular vote.9 Because the constitution permitted amendment 
with a single two-thirds vote of the unicameral parliament, 
Fidesz’s constitutional majority allowed it to rewrite the 1989–
1990 constitution and thousands of pages of new laws in Orbán’s 
first term.10 Before benefiting from the election laws that his gov-
ernment drew up to guarantee that he would win another term in 
2014,11 Orbán’s early legal initiatives attacked the independence 
 
 8 I use “he” here not to ignore gender but precisely to highlight that the classic cases 
so far have involved male leaders. Therefore, using “she” as a generic would be misleading. 
 9 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution, in 
Armin von Bogdandy and Pál Sonnevend, eds, Constitutional Crisis in the European Con-
stitutional Area 111, 111–12 (Oxford 2015). 
 10 Id at 111–13. I call the 2010–2014 term Orbán’s first term in office even though 
he had already been prime minister once before from 1998–2002. Though his autocratic 
tendencies were visible even then, the government of 1998–2002 was a coalition govern-
ment in which Orbán’s party, Fidesz, was the lead party. But because the other center-
right parties with whom Orbán was in coalition failed to support Orbán’s more radical 
initiatives, this earlier government was not operating purely on Orbán’s script. After 2010, 
the Fidesz party, operating in close coordination with the Christian Democracy Party, held 
68 percent of the seats in the parliament, giving Orbán a constitutional majority for his 
initiatives. 
 11 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary: An Election in Question, Part 1: The Political 
Landscape (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NB4R-UMWQ (laying 
out the distribution of political forces that were the object of gaming in the election rules); 
Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, an Election in Question, Part 2: Writing the Rules to Win—
the Basic Structure (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/95M5-6573 
(showing how a combination of gerrymandering and new rules awarding parliamentary 
seats tilted the election in the governing party’s favor); Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, an 
Election in Question, Part 3: Compensating the Winners (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/U39T-9VMP (showing how the majority party turned its margin 
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of crucial institutions, such as the judiciary, the media, the pros-
ecutor’s office, the tax authority, and the election commission.12 
One of his first targets was the constitutional court, which none-
theless took three years to capture. Soon all other independent 
institutions were filled with party loyalists, including the ordi-
nary judiciary, so that they were no longer independent of the 
governing party.13 Orbán removed opposition figures and neutral 
experts from public institutions, expanded the length of their suc-
cessors’ terms of office so that they would carry his influence be-
yond the usual term of a democratic government, and wrong-
footed the opposition by changing parliamentary procedure so 
that opposition MPs could not even speak on the floor, let alone 
offer any amendments to government bills.14 With a constitutional 
supermajority that meant he could change any law in the system 
at will, including the constitution, Orbán carried out an auto-
cratic revolution with exquisite legal precision.15 
If this had happened only in Hungary, it might be dismissed 
as a freak occurrence. But Hungary was not alone. Orbán liber-
ally borrowed some of his own illiberal tactics from autocratic le-
galists who had gone before him, and he has passed some of his 
 
of victory into a supermajority result and interfered with the independence of the Election 
Commission); Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, An Election in Question, Part 4: The New 
Electorate (in Which Some Are More Equal than Others) (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/69HC-4XJ5 (showing how nearly half a million voters were dis-
enfranchised and a different half million new voters were added to the voter rolls, while a 
clever system to divert minority votes to ethnic lists was designed to ensure that ethnic 
minorities would never gain any parliamentary seats); Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, An 
Election in Question, Part 5: The Unequal Campaign (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/63D5-9MST (showing how the campaign rules and the election author-
ities themselves benefited the governing party). The election monitors agreed with most 
of these criticisms of the election system, concluding that “[t]he main governing party en-
joyed an undue advantage because of restrictive campaign regulations, biased media cov-
erage and campaign activities that blurred the separation between political party and the 
State.” See generally Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Hungary, Par-
liamentary Elections, OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report 
(Apr 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/54RZ-7Y6P. 
 12 See Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, and Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Illiberal 
Turn: Disabling the Constitution, 23 J Democracy 138, 139–44 (July 2012); Miklós 
Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, and Kim Lane Scheppele, From Separation of Powers to Govern-
ment without Checks: Hungary’s Old and New Constitutions, in Gábor Attila Tóth, ed, 
Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law 237, 238–39 
(CEU 2012). 
 13 See Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution at 115–19 
(cited in note 9). 
 14 See Bánkuti, Halmai, and Scheppele, From Separation of Powers to Government 
without Checks at 239 (cited in note 12). 
 15 See Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution at 113 (cited 
in note 9). 
2018] Autocratic Legalism 551 
own techniques on to others. Even before Hungary’s fall from 
democratic grace, President Vladimir Putin in Russia had consol-
idated his power through law by, among other things, canceling 
elections of local governors and appointing his own handpicked 
candidates instead.16 Orbán copied Putin by first centralizing 
many local government functions in his new constitution and 
then handpicking all of the local government leaders to make 
them personally loyal to him.17 Both Orbán and Putin established 
a “vertical of power”18 (as the Russians call it) to give the national 
leader a direct line into the local governments to exercise de-
tailed control of their actions without going through the national 
parliament. 
Orbán also borrowed from the prime minister (now president) 
of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who, among other things, man-
aged to flummox critics by packing the Constitutional Court of 
Turkey with judges of his own choosing while simultaneously ex-
panding their jurisdiction to handle many more cases, something 
that could be viewed as either a boost to or the destruction of the 
institution.19 Orbán did the same thing one year later, as he ex-
panded the number of judges on the Constitutional Court of 
Hungary to give his party control over the court, but, at the same 
time, gave the court jurisdiction over constitutional complaints, 
individual petitions from those who claim that their individual 
rights are violated. This move was anticipated to flood the court 
with many politically insignificant cases, which would require 
 
 16 See Kim Lane Scheppele, “We Forgot about the Ditches”: Russian Constitutional 
Impatience and the Challenge of Terrorism, 53 Drake L Rev 963, 1013–15 (2005). 
 17 See Bálint Magyar, Autocracy in Action—Hungary under Orbán (Heinrich Böll 
Stiftung, May 18, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/P7QM-4NUT: 
Finally, during the latest municipal elections in the autumn of 2010, Orbán re-
placed those old local Fidesz cadres [who] still enjoyed some independence with 
his vassals. It was no longer enough to be a loyal party member; in Fidesz, one 
had to be devoted to the party leader. Fidesz members know what happens when 
one questions Orbán’s decisions or openly rebels against them. A slip of the 
tongue can end a party career. Those who are insubordinate are expelled, for-
ever; there is no repose. Fidesz members were the first Hungarians to learn that 
“these guys mean business.” 
 18 Scheppele, 53 Drake L Rev at 1013 (cited in note 16). 
 19 See Steven A. Cook, How Erdogan Made Turkey Authoritarian Again (The Atlantic, 
July 21, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/MVN9-HWGM (showing how Erdoğan first lib-
eralized Turkey and prepared it to join the European Union and then backtracked with 
reforms that allowed him to pack the courts with sympathetic judges; because the court-
packing reforms also included liberalizing moves at the same time, critics did not know 
what to make of them). 
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more judges in order for the court to function properly.20 So, was 
the expansion of the number of judges court packing or was it a 
sign that the leader intended to support the court by giving it the 
resources it badly needed? By adding judges, both Orbán and 
Erdoğan confused critics who could not tell if the courts were be-
ing politically compromised or judicially bolstered.21 
Orbán did not just borrow from others; he also bequeathed 
his own tactics to others. After Orbán’s success at foiling attempts 
by European institutions to halt the slide into autocracy,22 the 
new government in Poland began to travel down the same road 
 
 20 See Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution at 115–16 
(cited in note 9). 
 21 American readers will no doubt think of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1937 
court-packing plan as a parallel example. Facing repeated rejections of his New Deal 
agenda by the Supreme Court, Roosevelt proposed to add a new justice for every sitting 
justice over the age of seventy, a move that would have had the effect of allowing him to 
replace enough judges to generate a Court majority friendly to his programs. Like Orbán 
and Erdoğan, Roosevelt was well aware of how bad it would look to use court packing to 
achieve a particular substantive aim unless it were coated in a persuasive rationale. 
Roosevelt therefore undertook to dress up the proposed reform in a justification that had 
nothing to do with changing the decisions of the Court. Roosevelt pitched his move as 
necessary to maintain the vitality of an aging Court. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The 
Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing” Plan, 1966 S Ct Rev 347, 395. 
 While hiding the incapacitation of the peak court under cover of judicial reform makes 
the three cases of Roosevelt, Erdoğan, and Orbán sound familiar, there are still substan-
tial differences among them. First, Roosevelt considered a plan to amend the Constitution 
to change the Court’s composition, but this plan was abandoned because the outcome was hard 
to foresee, and it would have taken too much time in any event. Id at 384–86. Roosevelt then 
turned to Congress to pass a law to pack the Court. Id. Roosevelt’s plan ran aground on a 
resistant Congress whose upper chamber had the countermajoritarian institution of the 
filibuster to bolster minority opposition. See William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s Court-
Packing Plan: A Second Life, a Second Death, Duke L J 673, 681–84 (1985). Roosevelt 
failed not because his plan was so different but instead because the US constitutional 
order simply has more choke points that make seizing control of the courts difficult; 
Roosevelt was almost guaranteed to fail. In short, the US Constitution’s defenses against 
constitutional capture worked. 
 By contrast, both Orbán and Erdoğan, as prime ministers with guaranteed parliamen-
tary majorities governing under constitutions with easier amendment rules, saw their 
plans to pack their respective courts sail through. In Hungary, the unicameral parliament 
that had a supermajority of Fidesz supporters rubber-stamped Orbán’s scheme to change 
the system for electing judges. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Coups and Judi-
cial Review: How Transnational Institutions Can Strengthen Peak Courts at Times of Cri-
sis, 23 Transnatl L & Contemp Probs 51, 71–72 (2014). In Turkey, Erdoğan put the ex-
panded number of judges to a one-off national referendum that amended the constitution, 
a far easier process of constitutional amendment than the American one. See Can Yeginsu, 
Turkey Packs the Court (NY Review of Books Daily, Sept 22, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2VXW-5Y7X. Orbán and Erdoğan lived in different constitutional systems 
from Roosevelt that made their capture of the peak court much easier. 
 22 For a detailed account of the way that European institutions attempted (and 
failed) to halt Orbán’s seizure of the constitutional court, see Scheppele, 23 Transnatl L & 
Contemp Probs at 87–116 (cited in note 21). 
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using a map drawn by Orbán, starting with an attack on the 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal that centered on the appointment 
of judges before moving on to a full-scale assault on the ordinary 
judiciary.23 Poland borrowed from Hungary the method of gaining 
control over the lower courts by seizing appointment power over 
the court presidents and, through changing the court leadership, 
gaining control over the court system. In Hungary, this had been 
done by lowering the judicial retirement age in a civil-service sys-
tem in which the most senior judges had been promoted through 
long careers into the leadership positions, so that forcing early 
retirements opened up nearly half of the lower-court presiden-
cies.24 Poland did it slightly differently, by proposing in a bill to 
give the justice minister the power to fire the presidents of the 
lower courts within six months of the passage of a new law in 
summer 2017.25 Protests ultimately led the president to veto two 
of the three proposed bills reforming the judiciary.26 But just as 
Hungary had done before, Poland claimed that all of its judicial 
reforms borrowed the laws on the judiciary from some other (un-
named) member state of the European Union.27 An even more di-
rect borrowing of Hungary’s style of judicial takeover occurred in 
Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood government of President 
Mohamed Morsi did precisely the same thing as Fidesz in Hungary, 
 
 23 See generally Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of 
Law Backsliding in the EU, 19 Camb Yearbook Eur Legal Stud 3 (2017). 
 24 In Hungary, the move to lower judicial retirement ages was declared unconsti-
tutional by the constitutional court in its waning days of independence, but the court 
did so in a way that made no difference at all. See Kim Lane Scheppele, How to Evade 
the Constitution: The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s Decision on the Judicial Retire-
ment Age, Part I (Verfassungsblog, Aug 9, 2012) (explaining the decision), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3MES-6L6H; Kim Lane Scheppele, How to Evade the Constitution: The 
Constitutional Court’s Decision on the Judicial Retirement Age, Part II (Verfassungsblog, 
Aug 9, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3SL5-4E99 (noting that the decision made no 
difference because the court failed to give the claimant “any meaningful relief,” such as 
nullifying specific presidential orders through which the judges were fired). 
 25 See Anna Sledzinska-Simon, The Polish Revolution: 2015–2017 (ICONnect, July 
25, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/T2ZC-XVJK. 
 26 See Kinga Stanczuk, Making Politics Possible Again (Jacobin, Aug 12, 2017), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/85ZB-9EPC. 
 27 See Mehreen Khan, Poland Rebuffs EU Concerns over Politicisation of Its Judici-
ary (Fin Times, Aug 28, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/G36H-328C. There is something 
to Poland’s point that the country was meeting European standards. In Germany, the jus-
tice minister also presides over the process for appointing judges on all the high courts 
except for the constitutional court. But in Germany, there is a complex vetting process 
involving extensive consultation with many actors to depoliticize the process and ensure 
the quality of the judges. See Jenny Gesley, How Judges Are Selected in Germany (In 
Custodia Legis: Law Librarians of Congress Blog, May 3, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SYD4-3ZPX. These safeguards are missing in the Polish reforms. 
554 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:545 
proposing to lower the judicial retirement age to take over the 
most important positions in the judiciary.28 
On the other side of the world, the new autocratically legal-
istic revolutions in Latin America show that this phenomenon is 
not limited to right-wing or religious-nationalist leaders. Latin 
America also illustrates that ideas can spread from one legalistic 
autocrat to another. Hugo Chávez in Venezuela won the presi-
dency in 1998 by mounting an insurgent campaign from outside 
the two dominant political parties.29 Because his new victorious 
party had little toehold in the other branches of government, he 
launched a concerted attack on the constitutional system he in-
herited, summoning a new constituent assembly to write a con-
stitution that suited his new rule.30 He designed the rules for elec-
tion of representatives to this constituent assembly in a way that 
gave his party 95 percent of the seats in the assembly with 60 
percent of the popular vote.31 The new constitution that resulted 
from a convention full of chavistas (as Chávez supporters were 
called) gave Chávez substantial power to push through his auto-
cratic program. Among other things, it established a strong pres-
idency and eliminated the senate, which had been an important 
constraint on executive power before that time.32 
Rewriting a constitution to design a system suitable for an 
ambitious new leader was an idea that spread. Winning a presi-
dential election in 2006 on a revolutionary platform, President 
Rafael Correa of Ecuador copied Chávez by convening a constit-
uent assembly to write a new constitution more to his liking.33 
Correa’s new constitution was approved in a referendum in 2008 
with 64 percent public support. It mixed “hyperpresidentialism 
with an expanded list of rights,”34 a mix that is a signature ele-
ment of the new autocrats who confound their critics by adding to 
toxic constitutional change ideas that seem like constitutional ad-
vances. Both Chávez and Correa may well have given Orbán the 
idea that a new constitution would give him the opportunity to 
sweep away the power of the opposition if he could control the 
 
 28 See David Risley, Former President Morsi’s Attacks on the Judiciary, and Judicial 
Backlash (Egypt Justice, June 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/75FP-BF3G. 
 29 See David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 UC Davis L Rev 189, 203 (2013). 
 30 Id at 204–06. 
 31 See David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 Ala L Rev 923, 941–
42 (2013). 
 32 Corrales, 26 J Democracy at 38 (cited in note 7). 
 33 See Carlos de la Torre, Technocratic Populism in Ecuador, 24 J Democracy 33, 34 
(July 2013). 
 34 Id at 36. 
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process, which he then did to produce a constitution that was sup-
ported only by his own party.35 
I don’t mean to overstate the degree of similarity among le-
galistic autocrats. Not all of these governments followed precisely 
the same trajectory even though they were heading in the same 
direction. For example, only some of the legalistic autocrats 
started to attack the constitution itself immediately while others 
waited for some time before doing so. While Chávez, Correa, and 
Orbán changed their constitutions entirely as soon as they came 
to power, both Erdoğan and Putin were in office for years before 
it was clear that they planned to make structural changes to the 
organization of their governments to put liberal constitutional de-
mocracy in danger.36 
After more than a decade of autocratic consolidation, Russia 
and Venezuela seem to have fallen completely out of the family of 
global democracies,37 and Venezuela is showing signs of being a 
failed state.38 It seems to take a bit more than a decade after these 
sorts of reforms begin before the pretense of democratic and con-
stitutional government disappears entirely and the force under-
lying the system becomes openly visible. But not all states that 
start down this path of autocratic legalism necessarily end in a 
democratic death spiral. Some states pull back from the brink. 
For example, Ecuador seems to have avoided autocratic consoli-
dation for now because Correa accepted the failure of his attempt 
to extend the length of his term and then permitted an election to 
 
 35 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Unconstitutional Constituent Power *32–36 (un-
published manuscript, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/3DG2-RTXX. 
 36 Both Russia and Turkey tried at first to appeal to Western values. Suat 
Kınıklıoğlu, Turkey and Russia: Aggrieved Nativism Par Excellence (Turkey Analyst, May 
10, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/ 6CVR-LUVN: 
While the reasons behind their turn toward aggrieved nativism differ in Turkey 
and Russia, it is nevertheless noteworthy that their regressions were preceded 
by liberal and open eras. In fact, both Erdoğan and Putin tried to cooperate and 
to move their countries closer to the West. While Putin sought a framework 
where he could work with [NATO] and be part of an enlarged Europe, Erdoğan 
aggressively pursued accession negotiations with the [European Union]. Both 
leaders embarked on the path of aggrieved nativism after their attempts had 
failed. 
 37 Freedom House now ranks Venezuela and Russia as “not free.” Both showed large 
declines in freedom scores over the preceding ten years. See Freedom House, Freedom in 
the World 2017 *6, 10 (2017), archived at http://perma.cc/BT7J-HUAX. 
 38 See William Finnegan, Venezuela, a Failing State (New Yorker, Nov 14, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/VF9M-QFZX. 
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go forward that resulted in a relatively peaceful transfer of lead-
ership, though the post of president went to Correa’s protégé.39 
While Poland looks dire as I write, it is also clear that there is an 
active and well-organized opposition to the Kaczyński govern-
ment, along with at least some remnants of a pluralistic media 
and active civil society.40 It may have a better chance of pulling 
out of the tailspin than Hungary, where the media has been mo-
nopolized, civil society has been neutralized, the “democratic” op-
position (that is, opposition parties not including the far-right 
Jobbik party) has been completely ineffective, and more than half 
a million people have left the country.41 It certainly seems that 
not all autocratic legalist regimes have the same end point or 
move the same speed along a preordained path. 
It is important to remember that we are identifying a trend 
as it is emerging, and so we are evaluating many of these regimes 
in medias res, while they are still developing. While we can there-
fore see how these regimes start, we do not yet have a detailed 
map of how these experiments end. Some regimes labeled as au-
tocratic now may have a democratic rebirth later. Other regimes 
that are declining may fall into the abyss of authoritarianism. 
The phenomenon is still important, and worrying, even if it is only 
temporary. While autocrats consolidate power, things are bad 
enough. Moreover, liberal deconsolidation is serious enough to 
warrant an attempt to understand how autocratic legalism 
works. 
We can spot the legalistic autocrats while they are still con-
solidating power because they have ambitions to monopolize 
power and tend to use the same toolbox of tricks. It is the over-
reaching aspiration and the legalistic tools of the trade that turn 
the leaders I consider here into legalistic autocrats, not their rel-
ative success or failure in the end. Legalistic autocrats may be 
foiled and their illiberal reforms reversed. They may also turn 
into full-blown dictators. But first one must see them for what 
they are. They come to power and justify their actions through 
elections and then use legal methods to remove the liberal content 
from constitutionalism. 
 
 39 See Soledad Stoessel, The Left Won Ecuador’s Presidential Election: Cue Right-
Wing Revolt (The Conversation, Apr 17, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/EZ8Z-3JAP. 
 40 See Stanczuk, Making Politics Possible Again (cited in note 26). 
 41 See generally Hungary: Democracy under Threat (International Federation for 
Human Rights, Nov 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/2LG4-BMTZ; Justin Spike, More 
Than 600,000 Hungarians Could Be Living in Other EU Countries (Budapest Beacon, 
Sept 1, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/UTP3-YLF4 (noting the “probable number of 
Hungarians living in the EU was pushed slightly above 600,000”). 
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II.  LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY—AND 
THOSE WHO SPEAK IN THEIR NAME 
Legalistic autocrats operate by pitting democracy against 
constitutionalism to the detriment of liberalism. This is not hard. 
Democracy and constitutionalism are famously in tension when 
what the people want at any given moment is (or should be) over-
ridden by constitutional principles that thwart that desire. De-
mocracy is a political system in which leaders are accountable to 
the people; constitutionalism is a political system in which lead-
ers and the people together are additionally accountable within a 
system of constitutional constraint to uphold basic values that 
transcend the moment. Democracy and constitutionalism may 
come into conflict when publics fail in their constitutional obliga-
tions and elections produce a majority for unconstitutional 
change. Or the tensions between constitutionalism and democ-
racy may create a crisis when elites offer choices to democratic 
publics that put liberalism on the line. Legalistic autocrats know 
this and use a simplistic idea of democracy—what any particular 
election happens to have produced—to rail against any constitu-
tional constraint that stands in the way of what the people elec-
torate said they wanted. The end result when such a ploy suc-
ceeds is simple majoritarianism, which can lead quickly to 
illiberalism. Of course, the tension between democracy and con-
stitutionalism can be also resolved in a liberal manner. 
Democratic constitutionalism resolves the tension between 
democracy and constitutionalism by baking into constitutional-
ism the requirement of a self-sustaining democracy, a system in 
which the people can continue over time choosing their leaders, 
holding them to account, and rotating power when leaders disap-
point.42 The temporary frustration of a democratic majority in the 
name of a longer-term commitment to ensuring that democratic 
majorities can continue to choose their leaders into the future can 
be justified by taking the dignity and liberty of individuals—
including minorities now, as well as future persons later—as 
central obligations of constitutional governance.43 Short-term 
democratic frustration can be justified in the name of providing 
longer-term democratic guarantees. 
 
 42 For a similar argument, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of 
Judicial Review 101–04, 116–20 (Harvard 1980) (justifying judicial review as necessary to 
reinforce democratic representation and the equality of the vote on which it should rely). 
 43 See id at 101–04. 
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In its simplest form, a constitutional commitment to self-
sustaining democracy prohibits an elected leader from simply 
abolishing future elections. In its more complicated form, a con-
stitutional commitment to self-sustaining democracy requires 
that leaders be prohibited from hampering the institutional pre-
requisites for free and fair elections, among which are a plural-
istic media, a range of effective parties, an independent judiciary, 
recognition of a legitimate and loyal opposition, neutral election 
officials, a system of representation that does not unduly dilute 
the powers of minorities, and legally accountable police and secu-
rity services, as well as a free and active civil society—all of which 
should have constitutional protection for a democracy to be con-
sidered self-sustaining. In its even more substantive varieties, 
democratic constitutionalism is bound to honor what democratic 
publics should want if they were able to follow liberal theoretical 
commitments through from beginning to logical end point.44 Start-
ing from liberal premises, it is possible to construct the argu-
ments for both constitutionalism and democracy together. 
Liberal constitutionalism is democracy reinforcing because it 
binds all branches of government to two forms of constitutional con-
straint: (1) requirements that the state protect and defend the dig-
nity and liberty of individuals so that they may sustain, among other 
things, the capacities to be democratic citizens; and (2) require-
ments that all sources of public power be subject to binding legal 
checks that, among other things, ensure that leaders stay within 
legal limits and guarantee the orderly rotation of leadership in 
response to shifting democratic majorities. If democratic constitu-
tionalism ensures that the continued responsiveness of leader-
ship to electoral choice remains a higher-order value such that 
the winner of an individual election cannot displace it, then lib-
eral constitutionalism sustains the institutional channels 
through these choices as they occur and are translated into state 
action, and it provides continuing guarantees that the dignity and 
liberty of electoral and other minorities are accorded respect and 
protection. Because liberalism plays such a large role in this story 
of constitutional hijacking, it is worth recalling what liberalism is 
and is not. I use the term “liberal” as a description of a family of 
political philosophies, which does not mean—as it does in every-
day speech in America—that politicians are, or should be, on the 
Left. Liberalism grows from the Enlightenment struggle for the 
 
 44 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 195–200 (Belknap 1971) (defending a specific 
set of political values that liberals should want, among which are liberty and equality, and 
specific ways of reconciling the conflicts between the two). 
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recognition of the rights of individuals, including their right to be 
governed under self-limiting and checked authority, authority 
that has as its normative touchstone legitimation through demo-
cratic means.45 The era of democratic and liberal constitutional-
ism began in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century 
in political thought, picked up normative steam in actually exist-
ing politics with the birth of self-made government in the French 
and American Revolutions, was the aspiration behind many 
failed efforts to cast aside monarchies in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and became normatively dominant in the 
“First World” after World War II.46 With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (the “Second World” against which the “First World” had 
defined itself) and with the emergence of democratic governments 
first in Latin America and then in Africa, liberal and democratic 
constitutionalism has become the normative model for virtually 
all states emerging from autocratic rule.47 Liberalism as a govern-
ing political philosophy has both left and right variants, but it can 
be identified by its core commitments to the dignity and liberty of 
individuals and their democratic governance by self-limiting and 
accountable political power. I use “liberal” in this sense through-
out this Essay. The destruction of liberalism in nominally demo-
cratic and constitutional governments is a big deal. 
Liberalism animated the “rise of world constitutionalism.”48 
After the waves of democratization that started in the 1970s, lib-
eral and democratic constitutionalism came to be taken for 
granted as the end point of the evolutionary trajectory of the mod-
ern state.49 Holding elections, writing constitutions, guaranteeing 
the integrity of these constitutions through judicial review, estab-
lishing the multi-institutional protection of rights, and ensuring 
checked and balanced powers of government became such an au-
tomatic script for new democracies that “the end of history” 
seemed to have arrived.50 Francis Fukuyama gave voice to the 
 
 45 See Alan Ryan, The Making of Modern Liberalism 23–38 (Princeton 2012). 
 46 See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, The Agendas of Comparative Constitutional-
ism, 13 L & Cts 5 (Spring 2003). 
 47 See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 Va L Rev 771, 
772 (1997). 
 48 Id. 
 49 See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Con-
solidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe 3–15 (Johns 
Hopkins 1996) (describing the process of the consolidation of democratic states through 
three waves of democratization in Southern Europe, Latin America, and then Eastern 
Europe, though admitting that these new democracies might at some point break down). 
 50 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 Natl Interest 3, 3–4 (Summer 1989). 
Fukuyama’s essay seems like such a touchstone of this new era because it captured a 
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view that liberal and democratic constitutionalism was “the end 
point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization 
of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human govern-
ment.”51 And there was no turning back. The associated political 
science concept of the “consolidated democracy” cooked into its 
definition that democracy would be “the only game in town.”52 
And so it seemed, after so many authoritarian regimes were 
rejected in the last decades of the twentieth century, that demo-
cratic and liberal constitutionalism was the fate of the world. 
Democratic constitutionalism honored democracy by channeling 
it through institutions that would enable it to be self-sustaining. 
Liberal constitutionalism honored the rights of individuals by set-
ting limits on what governments could do in the name of majori-
ties and requiring that the institutions of a democratic state re-
main accountable and limited. Democratic and liberal 
constitutionalism put democratic electorates in charge of their 
own destiny, with political power controlled and checked in ways 
that would guarantee the continued respect for individuals and 
their ideas about self-governance. 
Until recently, illiberal leaders rejected liberalism, constitu-
tionalism, and democracy as a package. The classic twentieth-
century dictators opposed “liberal democracy” in favor of invocations 
of “peoples’ democracies” steered by a “vanguard party.”53 Some en-
couraged the belief that they alone could channel “the people,” 
 
widespread sense that the one true model of government had arrived, a model that guar-
anteed human freedom. But in saying this, Fukuyama repeated a theme that had been 
devised and refined throughout the Enlightenment, starting with Kant’s positing of free-
dom as existing outside of time, through Hegel’s belief that freedom existed at the end of 
history, through Marx’s mirror-image belief that freedom lay at the end of a process of 
historical class struggle. Continental political thought was long animated by the belief 
that history could be described by a narrative of progress, at the end of which was human 
freedom. See John McCumber, Time and Philosophy: A History of Continental Thought 
19–21, 46–49, 57–76 (Routledge 2003). It seemed to many observers in 1989 that this mo-
ment had actually arrived despite its always having been a fictional construction. 
 51 Fukuyama, 16 Natl Interest at 4 (cited in note 50). 
 52 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation at 5 (cited 
in note 49). 
 53 Vladimir Lenin developed the idea of the vanguard party and called his preferred 
form of government Social Democracy. See Vladimir Lenin, What Is to Be Done? *23, 55, 
70–81 (Marxists Internet Archive 1902) (Chris Russell, ed), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7XFU-R5PE. The term “people’s democracies” replaced Lenin’s term af-
ter World War II as the field of scientific communism became a school subject in Soviet-
inflected states. For one early statement of its tenets, see generally The Character of a 
“People’s Democracy,” 28 Foreign Aff 143 (1949). 
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surrounded by adoring masses because they were self-evidently ar-
ticulating the popular will.54 There was no need for free and fair 
elections when the people spoke either through a vanguard party 
representing their interests or through a leader who was their 
emanation. In the name of “the people,” dictators openly engaged 
in mass human-rights violations to remove enemies. They at-
tacked constitutionalism and its valorization of self-limiting gov-
ernment power.55 
Political orientation in such a black-and-white world used to 
be easy. Liberals were in favor of constitutionalism and democ-
racy, and illiberals were against both. One could therefore relia-
bly guess that a democratic and constitutional government would 
necessarily be liberal in practice. But that is precisely what auto-
cratic legalism changes. 
It has been said that hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays 
to virtue,56 so it was only a matter of time before the normative 
consensus around liberal and democratic constitutionalism fell 
under the sway of new and clever leaders who embraced the outer 
appearances of both democracy and constitutionalism while hol-
lowing out their liberal content. The new legalistic autocrats en-
thusiastically support elections and use their electoral victories 
 
 54 Young theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer coined the term Führer Princip to charac-
terize Adolf Hitler’s hold on the German public. In a radio address on February 1, 1933, 
only two days after Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, Bonhoeffer spoke on “The 
Younger Generation’s Altered View of the Concept of Führer.” The radio broadcast was 
cut off in midstream by censors. The closest text we have to Bonhoeffer’s account of the 
Führer Princip is a draft that approximates the one read on the radio in which Bonhoeffer 
noted: “This leader, arising from the collective power of the people, now appears in the 
light as the one awaited by the people, the longed-for fulfillment of the meaning and power 
of the life of the Volk.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Führer and the Younger Generation, in 
Carsten Nicolaisen and Ernst-Albert Scharffenorth, eds, 12 Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, 
Berlin: 1932–1933 268, 278 (Fortress 2009). 
 55 Professor Stephen Kotkin summarized Lenin’s views. Stephen Kotkin, 1 Stalin: 
Paradoxes of Power, 1878–1928 410 (Penguin 2014): 
Lenin railed against the idea that every society was made up of multiple inter-
ests that deserved competitive political representation and balancing as naively 
inviting in the “wrong” interests (“bourgeois” or “petit bourgeois”). He repudiated 
any separation of powers among executive, legislative, and judicial branches as 
a bourgeois sham. He rejected the rule of law as an instrument of class domina-
tion, not a protection against the state. He dismissed the self-organization of 
society to hold the state in check. The upshot was a brutal intensification of tsar-
ism’s many debilitating features: emasculation of parliament, metastasizing of 
parasitic state functionaries, persecution and shakedowns of private citizens 
and entrepreneurs—in short, unaccountable executive power, which was vastly 
enhanced in its grim arbitrariness by a radiant ideology of social justice and 
progress. 
 56 The maxim is from François duc de La Rochefoucauld, The Maxims of La 
Rochefoucauld 73 (Random House 1959) (Louis Kronenberger, trans). 
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to legitimate their legal reforms. They use constitutional change 
as their preferred vehicle for achieving the unified domination of 
all of the institutions of state. Like the hypocrite, the legalistic 
autocrats befuddle their critics by pretending to support many of 
the same values their critics do. And, like the hypocrite’s mislead-
ing statements, their deployment of public values is meant to dis-
guise that they intend just the opposite. 
Prime Minister Orbán in Hungary may be perhaps the least 
hypocritical among the new legalistic autocrats because he has 
openly embraced the “illiberal state,”57 but President Putin in 
Russia, President Erdoğan in Turkey, Jarosław Kaczyński in 
Poland, and President Chávez in Venezuela share a family resem-
blance with Orbán and his embrace of constitutional forms and 
democratic legitimation to hide something more deeply illiberal. 
They, too, insist that the majorities—real or apparent—that 
brought them to power can justify anything that they do, that mi-
nority rights merely reflect illegitimate political correctness, that 
checked and balanced powers give unwarranted strength to their 
opponents who (after all) were losers, and that constitutional ac-
countability and limited government are unnecessary when so 
much has to be done. Rather than rejecting the language of con-
stitutionalism and democracy in the name of a grand ideology as 
their authoritarian forebears did, the new legalistic autocrats em-
brace constitutional and democratic language while skipping any 
commitment to the liberal values that gave meaning to those 
words. 
Instead of operating in the world of liberalism, then, auto-
cratic legalists operate in the world of legalism. Liberal, demo-
cratic constitutionalism as a normative political theory is commit-
ted to the protection of rights, to checked power, to the defense of 
the rule of law, and to liberal values of toleration, pluralism, and 
equality. By contrast, legalism’s requirements are simply formal: 
law meets a positivist standard for enactment as a technical mat-
ter when it follows the rules laid down, regardless of the content 
 
 57 Csaba Tóth, Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 
26 July 2014 (Budapest Beacon, July 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/2N4Q-5N35: 
[The] Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that 
needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in this sense, the new 
state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not 
deny foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, etc. But it does not make this 
ideology a central element of state organization, but applies a specific, national, 
particular approach in its stead. 
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or value commitments of those laws.58 Laws that meet the test of 
legalism are enacted according to law; laws that meet the test of 
constitutionalism must substantively comply with the principles 
of a liberal legal order. When legality undermines constitutional-
ism, it is because the values of the new laws have superseded the 
values of constitutionalism rather than the other way around, as 
constitutionalism itself requires. The cure for laws that violate 
constitutional values is to nullify them as unconstitutional, which 
is one reason why some of the autocratic legalists begin their 
power grabs by disabling constitutional courts.59 But even when 
legalism undermines constitutionalism, it provides a backhanded 
tribute to the very constitutionalism it undermines. If making 
laws in a proper way were not so important for generating politi-
cal legitimacy, the autocrats would not have bothered being so 
legalistic. Instead, they are trying to capitalize on the normative 
force of formal constitutional procedures in order to justify their 
actions. 
To maintain liberal, democratic constitutionalism, however, 
a constitutional system must be able to separate the rules of the 
game from the game, so constitutional structures themselves 
must be protected outside the playing field of normal politics. 
There are many ways to do this—for example, creating high-bar 
amendment rules for constitutions,60 entrenching strong forms of 
 
 58 Perhaps the best account of legal positivism and its limits can be found in the 
Hart-Fuller debate of 1958. See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of 
Law and Morals, 71 Harv L Rev 593 (1957) (defending the insistence of positivist juris-
prudence to distinguish the law as it is from the law as it should be); Lon L. Fuller, Posi-
tivism and Fidelity to Law—a Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv L Rev 630 (1957) (criticiz-
ing Hart’s distinction of what the law is and what the law ought to be). 
 59 The constitutional court was the first target in both Hungary and Poland. See 
notes 24–25 and accompanying text. See also Pech and Scheppele, Illiberalism Within at 
*3–4 (cited in note 23). 
 60 A surprising number of constitutions feature “eternity clauses” that prevent cer-
tain features from ever being amended. See Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers 5–7 (Oxford 2017) (describing various 
kinds of clauses that themselves restrict how constitutions can be amended, leading to the 
phenomenon of the unconstitutional constitutional amendment). But at a minimum, con-
stitutional amendment typically requires supermajorities, time delays, and other rules 
designed to slow down and make more difficult the process of changing constitutional 
norms. Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 Wake Forest 
L Rev 913, 922–23 (2014). 
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judicial review,61 or nurturing a political culture that keeps poli-
tics within bounds.62 Within the purview of liberal, democratic 
constitutionalism, democratically elected leaders may not legiti-
mately attack these constraints, even citing a democratic man-
date, unless supermajorities over a sustained period support the 
changes and respect the views of those who disagree.63 
In what I have just argued, however, the careful reader will 
have noticed a certain lack of specificity about what precise norms 
and institutions a liberal constitutional democracy must contain. 
Instead, you will find a proliferation of versions of what a liberal 
constitutional democracy could be. It is fiendishly difficult to come 
up with a one-size-fits-all account of liberal constitutional democ-
racy that has concrete purchase when one considers actually ex-
isting constitutional orders. There are many variants of the phe-
nomenon with very different institutional and legal 
specifications. The United Kingdom has traditionally had little 
separation of powers, with the Parliament (itself not entirely 
democratically elected) not only exercising control over the func-
tional executive but also having the last word against the intru-
sions of courts.64 The United States has rather a lot of separation 
of powers, with an elected president and separate electoral bases 
for each house of Congress, accompanied by strong judicial re-
view.65 And yet both the United Kingdom and the United States 
are liberal, constitutional democracies. The variation extends to 
rights: Germany famously and constitutionally criminalizes not 
only hate speech but also Holocaust denial, while the US consti-
tutionally defends both.66 Italian constitutional law protects the 
statute of limitations as a substantive right while other European 
 
 61 Professor Mark Tushnet distinguishes between “strong form” judicial review that 
cannot be overridden by parliaments and “weak form” review that can. See Mark Tushnet, 
Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law ix–xi, 18–42 (Princeton 2008). 
 62 “Political constitutionalism” describes a constitutional system that relies on polit-
ical culture lodged in a supreme parliament to keep constitutional culture intact instead 
of relying on judicial review lodged in courts. See Marco Goldoni, Constitutional Reasoning 
According to Political Constitutionalism: Comment on Richard Bellamy, 14 Ger L J 1053, 
1053–62 (2013). 
 63 I have developed my theory of legitimate constitutional change. See generally 
Scheppele, Unconstitutional Constituent Power (cited in note 35). 
 64 Not only does the prime minister have to gain and keep the confidence of the 
Parliament, but no court may nullify an act of the Westminster Parliament for unconsti-
tutionality. See A.W. Heringa and Ph. Kiiver, Constitutions Compared: An Introduction to 
Comparative Constitutional Law 37–38 (Intersentia 3d ed 2012). 
 65 Id at 28–30. 
 66 See Winfried Brugger, The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional 
Law (Part I), 4 Ger L J 1, 11–14 (2003). 
2018] Autocratic Legalism 565 
constitutional systems see time limits on the prosecution of crime 
as a procedural protection that can be overridden when the sub-
stance is sufficiently important.67 And yet all are liberal, constitu-
tional democracies. In the abstract, these systems share common 
values at some deeper level; in practice, they vary a great deal in 
the particular institutional forms as well as in the detailed con-
stitutional doctrines that ensure the realization of these values, 
so much so that difference seems even larger than commonality 
up close. With regard to liberal, democratic constitutionalism, 
then, one might reverse the famous aphorism of Karl Marx: “All 
that is air melts once it becomes solid.”68 
Therein lies an opportunity, which the legalistic autocrats 
know full well. They have learned to speak the language of dem-
ocratic constitutionalism while identifying its resonant-frequency 
points of tension and complexity in order to reverse its effects. 
When one points out that the legalistic autocrats have gutted lib-
eralism in their defense of democracy, they point to examples in 
which some other constitutional democracy has done the same 
thing on some particular point without being attacked as a failed 
democratic or constitutional state. For example, the US engages 
in rampant gerrymandering,69 yet few think it is not a democracy 
or a constitutional one at that.70 Yet the Hungarian government 
 
 67 See Federico Fabbrini and Oreste Pollicino, Constitutional Identity in Italy: Euro-
pean Integration as the Fulfilment of the Constitution *11–14 (European University Insti-
tute Working Papers, June 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/DD29-WBBD (describing 
the Taricco litigation at the European Court of Justice and the conflict between the Italian 
rules on statutes of limitations and European norms). 
 68 The original quote is “All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, 
and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his 
relations with his kind.” Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist 
Party (Marxist Internet Archive, 2000) (Samuel Moore, trans), archived at 
http://perma.cc/526D-9ZHK. 
 69 See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerry-
mandering, 68 Stan L Rev 1263, 1267–69 (2016). 
 70 Elections are, of course, flawed. See Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights, United States of America—General Election, 8 November 2016: Statement of Prelim-
inary Findings and Conclusions *1 (Nov 9, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/5XKY-M2PL: 
The 8 November general elections were highly competitive and demonstrated 
commitment to fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly and association. 
The presidential campaign was characterized by harsh personal attacks, as well 
as intolerant rhetoric by one candidate. Diverse media coverage allowed voters 
to make an informed choice. Recent legal changes and decisions on technical 
aspects of the electoral process were often motivated by partisan interests, add-
ing undue obstacles for voters. Suffrage rights are not guaranteed for all citizens, 
leaving sections of the population without the right to vote. . . . While districts 
generally ensure equality of the vote, many [Election Observer Mission] inter-
locutors reiterated longstanding concerns that redistricting is a largely partisan 
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gerrymandered the whole country before the 2014 election and 
also rewrote the whole system of election rules that appear to 
mimic those rules in good democracies.71 The overall result was to 
rig the election so that the governing party could maintain its 
two-thirds parliamentary supermajority on an even smaller num-
ber of the votes,72 which made Hungary more autocratic than 
democratic. 
Worse yet, the legalistic autocrats may be right about the 
logic of comparison. They can point to the one feature they copied 
from a good country to bad effect while omitting from their re-
forms the supporting features that the other system used to com-
pensate for the flawed feature they borrowed. Yes, the United 
States engages in gerrymandering, but it does so for national elec-
tions in fifty different state processes (rather than in the whole 
country at once), with a requirement of near-equality in district 
sizes (unless one of a few compelling reasons to deviate can be 
demonstrated). These rules provide some limits to gerrymander-
ing,73 backed by some judicial review to rein in most egregious 
cases.74 Yes, the Germans have wide variation in the size of their 
electoral districts, permitting up to 15 percent variation above 
and below the mean district size, but strict proportional represen-
tation in the distribution of the party list seats in the parliament 
 
process, which has led to a number of uncompetitive contests. In these elections, 
28 candidates for the House ran unopposed.  
 71 See Scheppele, Hungary, an Election in Question, Part 2 (cited in note 11). 
 72 “Orbán’s two-thirds victory was achieved through legal smoke and mirrors. Legal. 
But smoke and mirrors.” Kim Lane Scheppele, Miklós Bánkuti, and Zoltán Réti, Legal but 
Not Fair (Hungary) (NY Times, Apr 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/WL22-NQ5M. 
 73 The Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the equal-district-size standard re-
cently in the context of reviewing a nonpartisan commission’s plan. See Harris v Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission, 136 S Ct 1301, 1306 (2014) (citations omitted): 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires States to “make 
an honest and good faith effort to construct [legislative] districts . . . as nearly of 
equal population as is practicable.” . . . The Constitution, however, does not de-
mand mathematical perfection. In determining what is “practicable,” we have 
recognized that the Constitution permits deviation when it is justified by “legit-
imate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.” . . . 
In related contexts, we have made clear that in addition to the “traditional dis-
tricting principles such as compactness [and] contiguity,” . . . those legitimate 
considerations can include a state interest in maintaining the integrity of polit-
ical subdivisions, . . . or the competitive balance among political parties. 
 74 See Wang, 68 Stan L Rev at 1270–80 (cited in note 69). As I write, the US Supreme 
Court has before it Gill v Whitford, a case that raises the question of how overt and skewed 
partisan gerrymandering can be before it becomes unconstitutional. For a summary of the 
arguments presented to the Court, see Amy Howe, Argument Preview: The Justices Tackle 
Partisan Gerrymandering Again (SCOTUSblog, Sept 26, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3SDQ-Z6DT. 
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makes the overall result match the national distribution of the 
public support for parties.75 If a legalistic autocrat strings to-
gether US gerrymandering with the permitted German variation 
in district sizes, however, then he can steal an election.76 Legalis-
tic autocrats become adept at culling the worst practices from lib-
eral democracies to create something illiberal and monstrous 
when stitched together.77 
In addition to adopting the worst practices from tolerably 
good systems, autocratic legalists have learned how to undermine 
liberalism itself by pressing on the points of tension between dif-
ferent theories of liberalism. Liberal values do indeed at times 
come into conflict. For example, some legalistic autocrats defend 
their own anti-liberal views by arguing that their opponents be-
lieve in illiberal political correctness, while only they defend truly 
liberal free speech. For example, Orbán perfected this sort of ar-
gument to claim the high ground on rights: “[P]olitical correctness 
transformed the European Union into a kind of royal court where 
everybody must behave well. . . . Liberalism today no longer 
stands for freedom but for political correctness, which is antithet-
ical to freedom.”78 
In this, Orbán is not alone. His fellow legalistic autocrats sing 
the same song.79 They mistake the conflict between two values—
 
 75 See Germany: Delimiting Districts in a Mixed Member Proportional Electoral Sys-
tem (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/72MR-H852. 
 76 See note 11 and accompanying text. See also Scheppele, Hungary: An Election in 
Question, Part 1 (cited in note 11). 
 77 See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why 
Governance Checklists Do Not Work, 26 Governance 559 (2013). 
 78 Éva Balogh, Trump and Orbán on Political Correctness (Hungarian Spectrum, Dec 
2, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/76NF-DXGL. Éva Balogh usefully summarized the 
evolution of Orbán’s uses of “political correctness”: In 2012, Orbán blamed political cor-
rectness for blocking discussion of “things that are essential to the very core of our civili-
zation.” Then a year later, he said that “the long-term decline of Europe” could not be 
“debated openly” due to political correctness. By 2014, Orbán identified political correct-
ness with liberal democracy, which he said was “a political system riddled with taboos.” In 
2015, he said that political correctness was responsible for Europe’s inability to defend itself 
against the incoming wave of refugees. And then he claimed that the entire Hungarian pub-
lic was politically incorrect: “The Hungarian people by nature are politically incorrect, i.e., 
they haven’t lost their sanity. They are not interested in bullshit [duma], they are inter-
ested in facts. They want results, not theories.” Id. 
 79 One of the Kremlin’s favorite journalists, Dmitry Kiselev, recently wrote: “East 
and west appear to be trading places. In Russia we now take full advantage of freedom of 
speech, whereas in the west political correctness, or political expediency in the name of 
security, have become arguments against freedom of speech.” Dmitry Kiselev, Russia and 
the West Are Trading Places on Freedom of Speech (The Guardian, Apr 10, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/GK6K-Q8XF. 
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freedom of speech and respect for the dignity of others—for a fight 
between liberalism and illiberalism. 
Autocratic legalists claim their legitimacy from having won 
elections (as constitutional liberals do), but then autocratic legal-
ists leverage the power of their resulting parliamentary majori-
ties to silence the opposition. The Polish government elected in 
2015 has claimed it is entitled to rid all branches of government 
of the “postcommunists” (where “postcommunist” identifies the 
center-left opposition and is, in their usage, a code for former com-
munists).80 They even have a campaign against the previous 
prime minister as a postcommunist traitor, despite the fact that 
he is president of the European Council, an unlikely position for 
a dangerous communist.81 We’ve seen a similar logic as the advo-
cates of Brexit (known as Brexiteers in the United Kingdom) have 
used some of the same strategies as the autocratic legalists by 
invoking the results of a deeply unclear plebiscite to prevent 
meaningful debate either about what the first plebiscite meant or 
about whether a second plebiscite would be a worthwhile en-
deavor, claiming the superior democratic authenticity of the first 
and shouting down all who have the temerity to disagree.82 
When they rewrite constitutions, autocratic legalists invoke 
their electoral (and therefore, in their view, democratic) legitimacy 
as they create an illiberal state. They develop a constitution- 
making process justified in the name of the majority, without in-
cluding any views of the minority, and voilà! A new constitutional 
 
 80 Poland’s Government Is Putting the Courts under Its Control (The Economist, July 
22, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/7E5W-6MKV. 
 81 Poland Has Reinforced Its Position as Europe’s Problem Child (The Economist, 
Mar 16, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/8UAH-4FP2. 
 82 For example, the pro-Brexit online magazine Spiked minced no words. Citing 
George Orwell on language, the deputy editor of the journal began his article attacking 
the British proponents of a second Brexit referendum: “We can’t let the enemies of democ-
racy pose as its guardians.” Tom Slater, No, a Second Referendum Would Not Be More 
Democratic (Spiked, Aug 10, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/98GF-9QCP. Critics of the 
Polish PiS government have been similarly attacked when the government asserts that 
the democratic public has spoken through the last election and therefore no one may ques-
tion what the public wanted. For example, according to the president of a major civil-
society foundation in Poland, speaking of the PiS government: “Their attitude is that every 
four years there are elections, but afterwards the party that has won the election should 
have full power, practically unlimited.” Rick Lyman and Joanna Berendt, As Poland 
Lurches to Right, Many in Europe Look on in Alarm (NY Times, Dec 14, 2015), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/world/europe/poland-law-and-justice-party-jaroslaw 
-kaczynski.html?_r=0 (visited Oct 30, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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order is born. Orbán, Chávez, and Correa all wrote new constitu-
tions soon after they took office.83 Erdoğan waited years and 
amassed power gradually through a series of constitutional refer-
enda, amending the Turkish constitution repeatedly to steadily 
concentrate executive power in a newly refurbished presidency. 
Finally, Erdoğan put to a popular referendum in April 2017 a set 
of constitutional amendments that consolidated immense power 
in the presidency whose incumbent would have the ability to stay 
in office until 2029, and perhaps even to 2034.84 The 2017 refer-
endum proposals eliminated the position of prime minister and 
gave all executive power to the president, including the power to 
issue wide-ranging decrees with legal effect.85 The power of the 
parliament to act in cases when the president would object to its 
direction was also reduced, and the amendments also bolstered 
the president’s legal ability to control the appointment of judges.86 
Erdoğan’s constitutional program passed by 51 percent to 49 per-
cent.87 The autocratic legalists often make a giant public show of 
being governed by and governing within the law, changing the 
law and even the constitution itself with impeccably legal (if illib-
eral) methods. But underneath the legal reforms carried out in 
the name of democracy is the illiberal sensibility of the autocrat 
and the steady consolidation of power in fewer and fewer hands. 
As this evidence reveals, liberal constitutionalism becomes 
endangered when the rules of the game are themselves gamed. 
This can occur, and often does, even before a charismatic leader’s 
campaign to sweep away “all that” becomes powerful enough to 
win elections. Alexis de Tocqueville’s explanation of the French 
Revolution is generalizable: for a revolution to topple the ancien 
régime, the ancien régime must have already been hollowed out 
from within.88 A revolution, in Tocqueville’s account, is therefore 
the final and not the first stage of political transformation. The 
modern legalistic autocrat who can quickly disable a liberal, 
democratic, constitutionalist political order is generally simply 
 
 83 See Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution at 111–13 
(cited in note 9); Landau, 47 UC Davis L Rev at 203 (cited in note 29); de la Torre, 24 J 
Democracy at 34 (cited in note 33). 
 84 See Sinan Ekim and Kemal Kirişci, The Turkish Constitutional Referendum, Ex-
plained (Brookings, Apr 13, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/8KAL-UR4G. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Kareem Shaheen, Erdoğan Clinches Victory in Turkish Constitutional Refer-
endum (The Guardian, Apr 16, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/UX5P-V9CW. 
 88 See Jon Elster, ed, Tocqueville: The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution 170–
85 (Cambridge 2011) (Arthur Goldhammer, trans). 
570 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:545 
taking in the political harvest others have planted. Or, he is tak-
ing advantage of structural weaknesses that exist in many com-
plex constitutional systems that give him the possibility of ex-
ploiting contradictions in the system for his own benefit. Bringing 
down a healthy constitutional, democratic, liberal order is not so 
easy unless the system is already weakened before the attempt. 
Revolutions in the name of democracy can sweep away des-
iccated illiberal constitutional orders, as occurred in the late 
eighteenth-century revolutions. But sometimes revolutions in the 
name of democracy can sweep away desiccated liberal constitu-
tional orders, as well. Trying to stop the masses with appeals to 
constitutionalism does not always work because the restraints of 
liberalism are not always democratically appealing when there 
seems to be a crisis—of events, of confidence, of an approaching 
enemy. Democracy without liberal constitutional constraint can 
degenerate quickly into pure majoritarianism, in which the rights 
of minorities are not recognized and in which leaders convert 
transient majorities into permanent authorizations to rule. Il-
liberal revolutions can be very powerful. They can destroy frag-
ile liberal and constitutional principles in a spasm of apparent 
democracy. 
Within the general phenomenon of democratic decline, then, 
some cases are particularly challenging because they pit a purely 
majoritarian conception of democracy harnessed to formally legal 
change against a more complex and often internally contradictory 
liberal constitutional order. The new autocrats, to be sure, are not 
liberals. Their anti-liberalism can come from the right (Orbán in 
Hungary and Kaczyński in Poland), from the left (Chávez and his 
successor Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, and Correa in Ecuador), 
and from some combination of religiosity and nationalism (Putin 
in Russia and Erdoğan in Turkey). Regardless of the source of 
their anti-liberal political views, however, these new autocrats 
are similar in that they use their democratic mandates to disman-
tle constitutional constraints. Professor Jan-Werner Müller has 
called this phenomenon “constitutional capture”89 because the 
new autocrats precisely target the features of the constitutional 
order that will ultimately stand in the way of their domination of 
the political space. 
 
 89 According to Müller, “Constitutional capture aims at systematically weakening 
checks and balances and, in the extreme case, making genuine changes in power ex-
ceedingly difficult.” Jan-Werner Müller, Rising to the Challenge of Constitutional Cap-
ture (Eurozine, Mar 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NWB7-ZVKW. 
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Because the legalistic autocrats deploy the rhetoric of democ-
racy and the methods of the law, observers find it hard to see the 
danger until it is too late. The next Part turns to the question of 
how we might identify legalistic autocrats in time to limit the 
damage they can do. 
III.  THE TACTICS OF THE LEGAL AUTOCRATS 
How do the new autocrats get away with transforming liberal 
democratic constitutionalism into pure majoritarian legalism? 
This Part shows precisely how the new autocrats hide what they 
are doing under the cover of conforming rhetoric and how they 
use liberal methods to achieve their illiberal results. The combi-
nation disarms their critics and allows them to entrench their 
rule. 
The first trick of the new autocrats involves reliance on stick-
figure stereotypes about illiberalism that are in people’s heads. 
The catastrophic twentieth-century authoritarianisms are cus-
tomarily portrayed in particular ways, and many people are edu-
cated into these particular narratives of what counts as a danger 
signal that authoritarianism is on the horizon. Legalistic auto-
crats then do something very different to consolidate their power 
so that they can say that they are not authoritarians. In a world 
in which the villains of the twentieth century come prepackaged 
in particular narratives, the new villains of the twenty-first cen-
tury go out of their way to avoid the unflattering comparison. 
There’s the Hitler scenario:90 A leader motivated by an over-
whelming ideology comes to power and arranges to have a state 
of emergency declared, perhaps because of a transformative event 
(for example, the Reichstag fire) that the leader’s supporters may 
well have staged.91 The emergency provides cover for disabling 
the guardians at the barricades of constitutionalism. Rights are 
suspended and parliamentary power usurped. Paramilitaries 
take over from the normal civilian institutions of state.92 The 
leader blames a domestic enemy and soon scapegoats part of the 
population as an excuse for depriving that group of its rights.93 
 
 90 The scenario is summarized from the narrative in Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional 
Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies 29–74 (Transaction 2002) 
(originally published 1948) (blaming Hitler’s rise to power on the unconstrained use of 
emergency powers). 
 91 How Hitler Consolidated Power 1933–1934 (BBC, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/BY25-AU92. 
 92 See Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship at 43 (cited in note 90). 
 93 Id at 61–62. 
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The threat of internal enemies mobilizes the rest of the popula-
tion to withdraw support from their fellow citizens, who then be-
come vulnerable to even more extreme rights violations. Eventu-
ally, the leader leads the country into war.94 The war provides 
cover for genocide and other massive violations of human rights, 
portrayed as the reason why the authoritarian wanted power in 
the first place. 
Then there’s the Stalin scenario: A leader motivated by an-
other overwhelming ideology fights his way to the top using “ide-
ology, trickery, and violence.”95 He ruthlessly sidelines all rivals; 
he consolidates control first over the Party, then over the coun-
try.96 The entrenchment of his regime kills millions while the im-
prisonment, torture, and execution of dissidents occurs on a truly 
vast scale.97 He destroys the preexisting institutions and governs 
ruthlessly without limit by capturing the state for repressive pur-
poses.98 Freedom is extinguished, and rights are honored only in 
the breach. 
In both stick-figure scenarios, the concentration of power is 
brutal, complete, and completely obvious. Both narratives feature 
leaders who justify what they are doing in the name of a strong 
authoritarian ideology. The onset of authoritarianism is accom-
panied by the violent takeover and destruction of the previous po-
litical institutions. The agents of destruction are irregular para-
militaries, secret police, and party organs who come from outside 
the system to crush it. Authoritarian leaders reduce those around 
them to puppets, brook no dissent, and leave no opposition stand-
ing. They monopolize power and destroy all semblances of plural-
ism as well as all claims to rights. Authoritarianism’s signature 
is the violation of human rights on a mass scale. When these 
things happen, you know you are in trouble. 
Of course, history is more complicated than either scenario, 
and that is precisely the point. The bite-sized takeaway lessons 
 
 94 Id at 31–32, 49–50. See also Who Was to Blame for WW2? (BBC, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/CVF4-CCNU. 
 95 This narrative draws from the popular summary provided by the BBC in its his-
tory program for British schools. See Stalin’s Takeover of Power *3 (BBC, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/8TVC-XABG. 
 96 See id at *1–2. 
 97 See Stalin—Purges and Praises *1 (BBC, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/DS3G-KQ86. 
 98 Stalin—Collectivisation (BBC), archived at http://perma.cc/MSK5-GDCF; Stalin—
the Five-Year Plans (BBC), archived at http://perma.cc/KXR9-D57H; Stalin—Monster or 
Necessary Evil? (BBC), archived at http://perma.cc/383D-JMAD. 
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from the two signature authoritarianisms of the twentieth cen-
tury constitute the modern repertoire of signals that the public 
will recognize as dangerous. These standard lessons learned from 
a complex history are often quite simple, and that leaves a lot of 
room to repeat history using some of the less well-known subplots. 
The bite-sized takeaway lessons from the two signature authori-
tarians of the twentieth century constitute the modern repertoire 
of signals that the public will recognize as dangerous. The prob-
lem is that people overlearn the simple lessons and believe that 
unless those precise things happen, the danger is not very great. 
The new autocrats know this and avoid repeating those well-
known scenarios that will attract immediate and overwhelming 
reaction. They take a kinder, gentler, but, in the end, also destruc-
tive path. They masquerade as democrats and govern in the name 
of their democratic mandates.99 They don’t destroy state institu-
tions; they repurpose rather than abolish the institutions they in-
herited.100 Their weapons are laws, constitutional revision, and 
 
 99 As President Erdoğan himself said on the one-year anniversary of the attempted 
coup that caused him to introduce an enduring state of emergency:  
Since its rise to power in 2002, the Justice and Development party (AKP), which 
I lead, has implemented reforms to empower elected officials at the expense of 
certain groups within the military. In doing so we have been able to restore the 
Turkish people’s confidence in public institutions. . . . This connection between 
the people and their government is the ultimate measure of our democracy’s re-
silience, and the strongest guarantee of its survival. 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey, a Year after the Attempted Coup, Is Defending Democratic 
Values (The Guardian, July 15, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/649S-KHDL. 
 And then, without the slightest trace of irony, he added that the popular uprising 
against the coup-plotters was a sign that democracy worked: “The thwarting of the coup 
marked a turning point in the history of democracy; it will be a source of hope and inspi-
ration for all peoples who live under dictators.” Id. 
 100 Prime Minister Orbán established control over the ordinary judiciary in Hungary 
by creating a new body, the National Judicial Office (NJO), to appoint, promote, demote, 
discipline, reassign, and dismiss judges. The NJO replaced the prior body, the National 
Judicial Council, with a name so similar that most people did not realize that the institu-
tion was wholly different. Moreover, despite the collective name, the new NJO consists of 
one person—the best friend of the prime minister’s wife and the wife of the man who led 
the team that drafted the new constitution. Unless someone were watching very closely, 
nothing would have appeared to have changed even as the judicial selection process came 
under direct political control. For a description of these judicial reforms, see Kim Lane 
Scheppele, First Let’s Pick All the Judges (NY Times, Mar 10, 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/W57G-6ATF. For condemnations of this arrangement, see generally Inter-
national Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute, Courting Controversy: The Impact of 
Recent Reforms on the Independence of the Judiciary and the Rule of Law in Hungary (Sept 
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/5Z3P-SJXE; Venice Commission, Opinion on the Cardi-
nal Acts on the Judiciary That Were Amended following the Adoption of Opinion CDL-
AD(2012)001 (Oct 12–13, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/VFM4-4AC4. 
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institutional reform.101 Their ideology is often flexible.102 And they 
leave just enough dissent in play that they appear to be tolerant. 
Instead of a scorched-earth policy that obliterates all opponents, 
one will find in these autocratically legalistic regimes a handful 
of small opposition newspapers, a few weak political parties, some 
government-friendly NGOs, and perhaps even a visible dissident 
or three (albeit always denigrated in the government-friendly me-
dia with compromising information—real or fake—so that hardly 
anyone can take these dissidents seriously).103 There is no state of 
 
 101 In summer 2017, the PiS government in Poland launched an assault against the 
judiciary in a very legal manner, through passage of a package of laws in the parliament. 
The laws left intact all existing institutions, but removed all of their sitting occupants. See 
Anna Sledzinska-Simon, The Polish Revolution (cited in note 25). The first law gave the 
government the power to appoint presidents and vice presidents of all courts, dismissing 
all those currently in place. The second bill fired the entire bench of supreme court judges, 
plus the entire professional staff of the court, to give the government the power to appoint 
all new judges. Finally, the third bill fired everyone in the council that appoints judges, 
permitting the government to appoint its loyalists. 
 In the end, Polish President Andrzej Duda vetoed the two most controversial laws that 
would have had the effect of firing all of the supreme court justices at once and giving the 
government control over appointing authority for selecting new judges, but he signed the 
law that allowed the Justice Minister to fire all of the court presidents below the level of 
the supreme court. See Michał Broniatowski, Polish President Andrzej Duda to Veto Con-
troversial Court Laws (Politico, July 24, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/BV36-7CLY. 
Duda then countered with a draft law for capture of the supreme court that would result 
in only 40 percent of the supreme court being removed immediately. See Paul Flückiger, 
Poland’s Judicial Reform: Andrzej Duda’s Rash Proposal and Pullback (Deutsche Welle, 
Sept 25, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/N7QM-AVWK. While it is clear that there is 
some division within the PiS party on the way to accomplish the takeover of the judiciary, 
the supreme court would not remain independent under any of the current proposals. 
 102 In fact, sometimes such leaders deny that they have any ideology. After President 
Trump’s election in 2016, Orbán said: 
The world has always benefited whenever it has managed to release itself from 
the captivity of currently dominant ideological trends . . . . In my view, this is 
what has happened just now in the United States. This also gives the rest of the 
Western world the chance to free itself from the captivity of ideologies, of politi-
cal correctness, and of modes of thought and expression which are remote from 
reality: the chance to come back down to earth and see the world as it really is. 
UK, Hungary Premiers Agree on Principle of Reciprocity (Hungary Today, Nov 10, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/WMJ4-LD7P. 
 103 Hungary has mastered the art of keeping just enough dissent and pluralism in 
play to not appear to be completely autocratic. But nonetheless democracy monitors have 
noticed. While the broadcast media are nearly completely controlled by the government 
and the largest circulation newspaper that printed news critical of the government was 
closed without warning in 2016, a few opposition newspapers survive. Freedom House now 
reports the Hungarian media scene as only “partly free.” Freedom of the Press 2017: 
Hungary Profile (Freedom House, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/5D65-7ZUJ. Political 
parties that might challenge the Fidesz government are weak and disorganized, one rea-
son why Freedom House demoted Hungary from the category of “consolidated democracy” 
to the category of “semi-consolidated democracy” in 2015, as all scores related to Hungary’s 
democratic health continue to decline precipitously. See Nations in Transit 2015, Hungary 
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emergency, no mass violation of traditional rights.104 To the cas-
ual visitor who doesn’t pay close attention, a country in the grips 
of an autocratic legalist looks perfectly normal. There are no 
tanks in the streets. 
The new autocrats achieve the look of normality by steering 
clear of human-rights violations on a mass scale, at least those 
human rights that have been entrenched in international conven-
tions and many national constitutions. Instead, the new autocrats 
eliminate their opponents by pressuring them differently: they 
drive their opponents out of the country rather than jail them, 
and they punish those who defy them through economic measures 
that might easily be confused with bad luck in free markets.105 
 
Country Profile (Freedom House, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SJ7F-QCJR; Nations 
in Transit 2017, Hungary Country Profile (Freedom House, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6YSK-BW8W. Civil-sector organizations critical of the Orbán government 
have been subjected to waves of attacks. See Timeline of Governmental Attacks against 
Hungarian Civil Society Organisations (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Apr 7, 2017), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/E7CL-YTFU. And yet, with all of these changes, Freedom House 
still ranks Hungary overall as a “free” country because it has maintained just enough of 
all of the key elements to keep its place in the highest category. Freedom in the World 
2017: Hungary Profile (Freedom House, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/5FJD-PHL2. 
 104 That said, emergencies are not completely absent from the tools of governance in 
these legalistically autocratic states. Turkey declared a state of emergency after the 2016 
attempted coup and remains in that state as I write in January 2018. See Gabriela 
Baczynksa, Europe Rights Watchdog Says Turkey’s Emergency Laws Go Too Far (Reuters, 
Oct 6, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Z94J-WU89. Hungary declared a “migration state 
of emergency” in 2015 that remains in force and gives the police extra powers to search 
homes and create cordon zones, an emergency it keeps extending. Hungary Extends State 
of Emergency Due to Migrant Crisis (Star Tribune, Aug 30, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/A57C-CD3H. Venezuela has resorted to a state of emergency as the political 
crisis under President Maduro has worsened. See Venezuela Crisis: Maduro’s State of Emer-
gency ‘Constitutional’ (BBC, May 20, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/FD5T-WCDA. But 
in all of these cases, the states of emergency came late in the consolidation of power and 
was not one of the first tools used to put in place the new autocratic system. 
 105 See, for example, Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary and the End of Politics (The 
Nation, May 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/S9GZ-YJXG: 
Since Fidesz came to power, critics of the Hungarian government have been los-
ing their jobs at an astonishing rate. The first to be fired were people who worked 
in the state sector. Jobs always change hands as governing parties come and go, 
but the civil service is typically protected from widespread political retaliation. 
Not so in Hungary. As one of its first acts in office in May 2010, the Fidesz gov-
ernment altered the labor law that applied to the civil service. Suddenly, state 
workers who once had substantial job protections could be fired for any reason—
or no reason at all. The thousands of state workers who lost their jobs in the 
aftermath of this legal change were disproportionately those who opposed the 
governing party. . . . By May 2011, the state sector had been almost completely 
purged of opposition supporters. . . . 
 Since the first year of massive job losses, firings have spread beyond the state 
sector. Private businesses that sought government contracts were told in a whis-
per campaign that they had to purge all government opponents from their work-
forces in order to be eligible contractors. This rule applied to projects funded by 
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Opponents are fired from their jobs,106 denied social benefits for 
technical reasons, and evicted from their buildings because of 
small and technical violations.107 Owners of businesses that the 
government wants to seize in order to redistribute to its own allies 
are given offers that they cannot refuse.108 None of these measures 
amount to serious rights violations because economic security, the 
right to housing, the right to operate a business free of govern-
ment inspections, the right to a free university education, or the 
right to a basic income through either social welfare or pension 
programs are not rights one can successfully claim in most 
courts.109 Instead, the rights recognized by constitutions and 
transnational human-rights instruments are the rights violated 
by the great twentieth-century authoritarians who engaged in 
 
the [European Union] as much as to ones supported by Hungarian taxpayer 
money. Since roughly 50 percent of GDP is taken in and redistributed through 
the state in Hungary, either through public-sector employment or public con-
tracts to private businesses, the insistence by the Orbán government that all 
private-sector businesses fire opposition supporters to make themselves eligible 
for state contracts spread the economic pain far beyond the boundaries of the 
state.  
 106 See, for example, id. 
 107 For example, in Russia, the European University of St. Petersburg was closed in a 
swarm of technicalities. See Fred Weir, Why Is Someone Trying to Shutter One of Russia’s 
Top Private Universities? (Christian Science Monitor, Mar 28, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/S5WK-AXV7: 
Within weeks, 11 different agencies descended on the university to carry out 
snap inspections, and they logged 120 violations of various rules and regulations. 
None concerned the curriculum, and most were minor flaws in staff documenta-
tion, building code infractions, the lack of a stand displaying anti-alcohol infor-
mation, and no fitness room for the staff. At the same time, the local real estate 
authority filed a lawsuit demanding cancellation of the university’s rental per-
mit over alleged failure to comply with some contract clauses. 
 108 See, for example, Bálint Magyar, Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of 
Hungary 185 (CEU 2016): 
Businessmen familiar with economic life in Hungary say that Fidesz has gained 
control of three to four hundred private companies by force and blackmail since 
it came to power. . . . [A]n alarming phenomenon has descended upon the world 
of business activities, as the owners of prospering Hungarian businesses are ap-
proached by lawyers claiming affiliation to Fidesz, making an offer for the pur-
chase of the company at a fraction of its real value, achieved often at the cost of 
decades of hard work. The stealing of these companies, structurally supported 
by the authorities can already mean a threat to family businesses with a turno-
ver of a few hundred million forint, any downtown restaurant and better visited 
hotel among them. If the owner does not wish to give up their business with a 
major loss, the authorities soon make an appearance and make it impossible to 
manage with various measures. Whether the offer is accepted is only a matter 
of time. 
 109 See Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights at 170–72 (cited in note 61) (arguing 
that weak rights are not guaranteed to be directly enforceable in court). 
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genocide, political killings, imprisonment without trial, incommu-
nicado detention, torture, censorship, seizure of property without 
compensation, show trials, and searches of private homes.110 
The new autocrats aim to capture and exercise unconstrained 
power, but they have realized that they don’t need to annihilate 
their opponents to do so. Rather, the reverse applies. In keeping 
with their concern to maintain a legitimate public appearance, it 
is positively useful for the new autocrats to appear to have some 
democratic openness precisely so that they can claim that they 
are not authoritarians of the twentieth-century sort.111 They 
therefore tolerate a weakened opposition and other democratic 
signs of life, such as a small critical press or a few opposition 
NGOs, to demonstrate they have not completely smothered the 
political environment with their autocracy.112 
 
 110 See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 44–45 (Belknap 
2010) (showing how the current conception of human rights emerged from a Cold War 
dynamic in which the signature violations of the Soviet Union were the primary target). 
 111 See, for example, Dimitry Trenin, Russia Is the House that Vladimir Putin Built—
and He’ll Never Abandon It (The Guardian, Mar 27, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/KPM7-XMFF: 
An autocrat with the consent of the governed, Putin has preserved the essential 
personal freedoms that the Russian people first earned with the demise of the 
Communist system. People can worship and travel freely; Facebook and Twitter 
are essentially unrestricted; there are even a few tolerated media outlets overtly 
in opposition to the Kremlin. Political freedoms, however, are more tightly cir-
cumscribed, so as to leave no chance to potential “colour revolutionaries” or po-
litically ambitious exiled oligarchs. For the bulk of the population, this matters 
little; the relatively few activists have a choice of taking it—or leaving. 
 112 After detailing the methods through which the Fidesz Party in Hungary and the 
PiS Party in Poland managed to consolidate their hold over the major media outlets while 
leaving a few small venues for opposition views, Jakub Dymek and Zsolt Kapelner noted: 
It is important to remember that all of this is happening not in far-away dicta-
torships or military autocracies. These are democratic countries, members of the 
European Union, that ostensibly maintain the same standards as the UK or the 
United States. Since the fall of communism, Poland in particular has presented 
itself as a beacon of democracy and poster child for market reforms. Its rapid 
backtracking on free expression reveals how quickly democracy can be hollowed 
out even as its formal structures remain in place. Press freedom in Hungary and 
Poland is suppressed not by decrees nor by threat of imprisonment or execution, 
but by financial machinations, legislative maneuvers, and political pressure . . . . 
 The threat here is not so much that the propaganda’s message takes root in-
stantly, although its effects are notable. The “effectiveness” of these moves is 
measured more in how many can be fatigued into silence. The regime wins not 
just when there is majority support for its agenda, but when the majority lacks 
the interest, energy, or dedication to voice dissent . . . . Illiberal governments 
triumph by making all media weaker, for their ultimate goal is to eliminate de-
bate—not necessarily to win popular support. 
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Of course, it is a sign of progress that the new autocrats steer 
clear of mass human-rights violations and tolerate limited oppo-
sition; the human-rights movement has succeeded in many ways. 
But the new autocrats have found new pressure points to sideline 
their opponents that are clearly understood as coercive by those 
targeted but that are not protected by constitutional rights. New 
autocrats have learned that they can consolidate their power if 
they can simply get their opponents to give up and go away, or 
stay home and mind their own business. They don’t need to im-
prison or kill those who object to autocracy; they simply need to 
get them to tolerate the diminished freedoms on offer. 
The new autocrats will therefore not look like your father’s 
authoritarians who want to smash the prior system in the name 
of an all-encompassing ideology of transformation. Portraying 
themselves as democratic constitutionalists is absolutely essen-
tial to their public legitimation; what is missing in the new dem-
ocratic rhetoric is any respect for the basic tenets of liberalism. 
They have no respect for minorities, pluralism, or toleration. They 
do not believe that public power should be accountable or limited. 
In short, liberalism is gutted by the new autocrats while they 
leave the facades of constitutionalism and democracy in place. 
Election opponents may be harassed with nuisance criminal 
charges, but they do not wind up in jail, or at least not for long.113 
Civil-society groups may be defunded, but they are not closed by 
the government.114 The press that supports the opposition is not 
censored, but it may be starved of advertising and then bought 
 
 Such subtle methods of oppression, manipulation, and domination are becom-
ing the norm rather than the exception amid the nationalist and populist surge 
in Eastern Europe today. 
Jakub Dymek and Zsolt Kapelner, It Doesn’t Take a Dictator to Smother a Free Press 
(Dissent, May 3, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/D2B6-MWBV. 
 113  See, for example, David M. Herszenhorn, Aleksei Navalny, Putin Critic, Is Spared 
Prison in a Fraud Case, but His Brother Is Jailed (NY Times, Dec 30, 2014), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/europe/aleksei-navalny-convicted.html (visited 
Sept 11, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing the Russian government’s treat-
ment of opposition figure Aleksei Navalny, who was jailed for failing to get permits for his 
demonstrations and was eventually charged with the more serious but unrelated crime of 
embezzlement; while he was given a suspended sentence in the end, his brother was ar-
rested on apparently trumped-up charges, leading Navalny’s supporters to charge that the 
Russian government was taking hostages). 
 114 See, for example, Aleksandra Eriksson, Hungary and Poland Risk Losing €1bn in 
Norway Aid Row (EU Observer, May 3, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/HMR6-ATKD 
(describing Hungary’s and Poland’s efforts to divert European Economic Area grant fund-
ing from organizations supporting human rights, women, gay people, and the homeless to 
organizations that support the government). 
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out by oligarchs connected to the winners.115 The elections that 
keep the new autocrats in power are rigged in technical ways be-
hind the scenes rather than through obvious tactics that can be 
spotted by observers, such as ballot-box stuffing.116 Through these 
nonviolent means, democracy is transformed into brute majoritar-
ianism. The rigged elections—rigged in ways that election moni-
tors cannot see—even prove that the public supports the autocrat! 
What causes liberal constitutional democracies to fail? 
Tocqueville’s diagnosis of what makes revolutions succeed is still 
apt: liberal constitutionalism must have been ill long before the 
disease became fatal, if it can be toppled so quickly. Critics can 
disagree about when the illness began and what caused it, but 
perhaps we can agree on what has accompanied the loss of sup-
port for both liberalism and constitutionalism: radical political 
polarization,117 the rise of increasingly bad electoral choices,118 the 
inability of party systems to handle shifts in voter preferences,119 
 
 115  See, for example, Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Free Media (NY Times, Mar 14, 
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/YKR2-4VC9 (describing how after the 2010 election, the 
government, which was the biggest media advertiser, pulled its adds from opposition me-
dia and pressured private advertisers to follow suit by threatening the loss of government 
contracts). Or the media are seized by oligarchs related to the governing party. See, for 
example, Andrew Byrne, Hungary’s Largest Independent Newspaper Closed Down (Fin 
Times, Oct 8, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/2NNP-8D3K. 
 116 While in-person voter fraud and ballot-box stuffing can be caught by observers, 
the new election rigging often occurs through manipulation of vote-counting software, in-
visible to election observers. See, for example, Venezuela’s Shameless and Colossal Vote-
Rigging (The Economist, Aug 3, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/833M-QXYP (explain-
ing that the government inflated turnout numbers to give the impression its new consti-
tution was more widely supported); Scheppele, Hungary, an Election in Question, Part 2 
(cited in note 11) (noting that Hungary’s government nationalized the previously inde-
pendent company that developed the software for vote counting amid claims of a rigged 
election). My Princeton colleagues Ed Felten and Andrew Appel have demonstrated how 
relatively easy it is to hack the software in voting machines. See Ben Wofford, How to 
Hack an Election Machine in 7 Minutes (Politico, Aug 5, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z8X8-UTF2. 
 117 See Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: 
The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches 1–16 (MIT 2d ed 2016). See also Emilia 
Palonen, Political Polarisation and Populism in Contemporary Hungary, 62 Parliamen-
tary Aff 318, 321 (2009) (arguing that polarization is a political tool in Hungary that 
presents a problem for democracy, and was so even before Orbán’s election in 2010). For 
Turkey, see E. Fuat Keyman, The AK Party: Dominant Party, New Turkey and Polariza-
tion, 16 Insight Turkey 19, 21 (Spring 2014). 
 118 See Zsolt Enyedi, Populist Polarization and Party System Institutionalization: The 
Role of Party Politics in De-democratization, 63 Probs Post-Communism 210, 211 (2016). 
 119 See generally Robin E. Best, How Party System Fragmentation Has Altered Polit-
ical Opposition in Established Democracies, 48 Govt & Opposition 314 (2013). 
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the resistance of economic policy to the rotations of ordinary elec-
tions,120 political fallout from traumatic economic shocks,121 the 
politicization of the judiciary,122 corrupt agreements among polit-
ical elites,123 and more. 
Eventually—and this is the story in many of the places where 
the new autocrats eventually win elections—a dysfunction in the 
party system allows a mainstream political party to be captured124 
or, alternatively, some rupture in the world (an economic crisis, 
a political scandal, a national trauma) leads to the sidelining of 
established political parties because they are blamed for long-
standing problems.125 Many voters who become cynical after too 
many failed promises—and who already voted repeatedly for 
moderate change only to get no change at all—will then opt for 
illiberalism.126 A tsunami of an election finally tips a weakened 
constitutional structure into collapse. This is how charismatic au-
tocrats ascend to power. 
But the casualty here is liberalism, even as the external ap-
pearance of democracy and constitutionalism remain in place. 
 
 120 “Neoliberal authoritarianism” describes the inability of elected leaders to escape 
neoliberal economic policy, no matter what those leaders’ own political views are. Michael 
A. Wilkinson, The Specter of Authoritarian Liberalism: Reflections on the Constitutional 
Crisis of the European Union, 14 Ger L J 527, 528, 550–51 (2013). See Ian Bruff, The Rise 
of Authoritarian Neoliberalism, 26 Rethinking Marxism 113, 113–14 (2014). For the effects 
of neoliberal economic policy on democratic publics, see generally Larry M. Bartels, Unequal 
Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Russell Sage 2d ed 2016). 
 121 See Hanspeter Kriesi, The Political Consequences of the Economic Crises in 
Europe: Electoral Punishment and Popular Protest, in Nancy Bermeo and Larry M. 
Bartels, eds, Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Re-
cession 297, 297–98 (Oxford 2014). 
 122 See, for example, Matthew Taylor, The Limits of Judicial Independence: A Model 
with Illustration from Venezuela under Chávez, 46 J Latin Am Stud 229, 248–56 (2014) 
(explaining how the Chávez government undermined the judicial independence of the 
Venezuelan high court). See also James Melton and Tom Ginsburg, Does De Jure Judicial 
Independence Really Matter? A Reevaluation of Explanations for Judicial Independence, 2 
J L & Cts 187, 190 (2014) (concluding that judicial independence decreases when either 
the appointment or removal powers of judges are in political hands). 
 123 See Martin J. Bull and James L. Newell, Political Corruption in Europe, in José 
M. Magone, ed, Routledge Handbook of European Politics 669, 679–80 (Routledge 2015). 
 124 While state capture by a political party is different than party capture by a partic-
ular faction within a party, the two are often found together. See, for example, Abby 
Innes, The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe, 52 J Common Mkt 
Stud 88, 92–94 (2012). 
 125 For an example from Venezuela, see Jason Seawright, Party-System Collapse: The 
Roots of Crisis in Peru and Venezuela 1–2 (Stanford 2012) (discussing the collapse of the 
previously stable two-party system in advance of the Chávez election). 
 126 See generally Béla Greskovits, The Political Economy of Protest and Patience: East 
European and Latin American Transformations Compared (CEU 1998). For an update of 
his argument, see Béla Greskovits, The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East 
Central Europe, 6 Global Pol 28, 35–36 (Supp June 2015). 
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The problem is that ordinary lawmaking by democratic majorities 
requires limits set by liberalism. Process and debate must be re-
spected to ensure that minorities are not trampled. The loyal op-
position must be treated as standing inside rather than outside 
the circle of constitutional protection and must retain some role 
in the lawmaking process. Liberal constitutions require other 
ground rules, too. Rights of speech and assembly, the independ-
ence of institutions like courts, media, and the civil sector, as well 
as the guardianship of the constitution by an independent check-
ing body like a constitutional court, must be protected, even from 
democratic majorities. Against these liberal limits, the new legal-
istic autocrats argue that they cannot be constrained because 
they speak for the people. They summon legal and popular au-
thority as a way to justify everyday political decisions. They jetti-
son liberalism. 
IV.  WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
This Essay has shown that a new generation of autocrats has 
learned to govern by appealing to electoral legitimacy while using 
the tools of law to consolidate power in few hands. The new auto-
crats can and do win elections—often repeated elections—but, af-
ter their first victory, they stay in power by weakening the oppo-
sition support structures like parties and NGOs, by monopolizing 
the broadcast media to limit public debate, by harassing critics, 
and by tinkering with the election rules. They rewrite constitu-
tions to make what was once unconstitutional into something con-
stitutional. They do not, as a first resort, call out the tanks or de-
clare a state of emergency; they do not enter office with a phalanx 
of soldiers. Instead they come to power with a phalanx of lawyers. 
The new autocrats look like democrats playing hardball,127 not 
like dictators playing softball. 
The move from hardball democrat to legalistic autocrat is 
achieved by undermining constitutionally entrenched checks on 
executive power, often (as we have seen) by changing the consti-
tution so that what was once unconstitutional is no longer. By 
 
 127 Professor Tushnet has usefully called attention to the practice of “constitutional 
hardball,” by which he means “political claims and practices . . . that are without much 
question within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and practice but that are 
nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-constitutional understandings.” He shows 
how taken-for-granted understandings underpin a constitutional order until the moment 
that they don’t. At that point, the constitutional order is weakened, sometimes to the point 
of effective collapse. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 John Marshall L Rev 523, 
523, 549–53 (2004). 
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consolidating power under the guise of legality (often constitu-
tional legality), the autocrats set the stage for snapping the trap 
of democratic pretense when the tide of public opinion turns 
against them. Once the public loses the chance to change its lead-
ers when the romance wears off, autocracy is complete. But it is 
too late to use constitutional appeals to fight autocracy at that 
point because the constitution has become a hollow shell. 
By now it should be clear that many of the changes that re-
sult in the de-liberalization of constitutional systems are highly 
technical and therefore hard for the ordinary citizen to under-
stand. How many people in the general public grasp the im-
portance of differences in complex rules about judicial appoint-
ments, or see the implications of jurisdictional tweaks to a court’s 
previous operating rules? How many people really comprehend 
that changing rules of parliamentary procedure or altering the 
structural composition of independent commissions or fiddling 
with the arcane processes for drawing electoral district bounda-
ries are crucial to the maintenance of liberal constitutionalism? 
Most people see only that there is a constitution still proclaimed 
in the name of “we the people.” They see that the same institu-
tions they knew before are still standing—the constitutional 
court, the parliament, the central bank, the election commission. 
What could have gone so badly wrong when so much looks the 
same? 
The takeaway lessons of the twentieth century prepare peo-
ple for different sorts of threats to liberalism: pervasive ideologi-
cal appeals that justify the destruction of institutions, the invoca-
tion of total emergency, mass violations of human rights, and 
tanks in the streets. By contrast, the new autocrats come to power 
not with bullets but with laws. They attack the institutions of lib-
eral constitutionalism with constitutional amendments. They 
carefully preserve the shell of the prior liberal state—the same 
institutions, the same ceremonies, an overall appearance of rights 
protection—but in the meantime they hollow out its moral core. 
Constitutional institutions survive in the same buildings, but 
their liberal souls have been killed. How many people can really 
see this until they themselves need constitutional protection and 
find themselves defenseless? By then it is too late. 
With the rise of autocratic legalism, we are witnessing new 
political technologies designed to accomplish the goals of autoc-
racy without its usual telltale signs. Autocrats can accomplish 
this because the democratic publics in these places were trained 
to look for the wrong signs of danger. As the new autocrats get 
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more and more clever, deploying law to kill off liberalism, consti-
tutionalists need to educate ourselves and democratic publics 
about liberal constitutionalism. 
First, those of us who work in the field of constitutional law 
have to stare into the face of the new autocracy to track in detail 
how it works. We need to learn to recognize the new signs of dan-
ger, which means that we need to get better at documenting the 
trouble cases and learning from them. 
Then, we need to educate others. Civic education needs to 
teach people to recognize the new signs of danger. Under what 
circumstances is it safe to trust the appointment of judges to a 
political process? When is presidentialism a sign of danger? How 
can the discretionary use of public power for economic intimida-
tion be curbed? Why is the call to draft a new constitution alarm-
ing? People beyond the educated elite need to know why these 
questions matter, and they need to learn how to think about an-
swering them. 
Law is too important to leave only to the lawyers. A citizenry 
trained to resist the legalistic autocrats must be educated in the 
tools of law themselves. Liberal and democratic constitutionalism 
cannot remain an elite ideal that has no resonance in the general 
public; that leaves this public ripe for autocratic legalists to sweep 
them away in the last remaining exercises of democratic power 
that the public may possess. In the days when dictators came to 
power through military force, civil defense courses provided train-
ing for publics to resist with arms. In the days when dictators 
come to power with law reform as their primary tool, civil defense 
requires citizens to be empowered with law. Citizens need to be 
trained as constitutionalists—to understand the point of consti-
tutionalism, to recognize threats to self-sustaining democracy, 
and to care about defending liberal values. 
Liberal and democratic constitutionalism is worth defending, 
but first we need to stop taking for granted that constitutions can 
defend themselves. 
